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The Parking Lot Problem

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Author Info
Maria Arbatskaya (Emory university)
Kaushik Mukhopadhaya
Eric Rasmusen (Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University Kelley School of Business)

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Abstract

If there is competition for access to an underpriced good such as a free parking spot, the competition can eat up the entire surplus, eliminating the social value of the good. There is a discontinuity in social welfare between “enough” and “not enough,” with the minimum social welfare being at slightly too small a parking lot because of the rentseeking efforts of drivers. Uncertainty over the number of drivers actually increases social welfare if the parking lot size is set too small; if it is set optimally, the parking lot size will be well in excess of mean demand.

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File URL: http://www.bus.indiana.edu/riharbau/RePEc/iuk/wpaper/bepp2007-04-arbatskaya-mukhopadhaya-rasmusen.pdf
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Paper provided by Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy in its series Working Papers with number 2007-04.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2007-04

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Related research
Keywords: rent-seeking all-pay auction timing capacity size queue

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General
R4 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Transportation Systems
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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    Other versions:
  3. Porter, Richard C, 1977. "On the Optimal Size of Underpriced Facilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(4), pages 753-60, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Deacon, Robert T & Sonstelie, Jon, 1991. "Price Controls and Rent Dissipation with Endogenous Transaction Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1361-73, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Hassin, Refael, 1985. "On the Optimality of First Come Last Served Queues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 201-02, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Arnott, Richard & de Palma, Andre & Lindsey, Robin, 1993. "A Structural Model of Peak-Period Congestion: A Traffic Bottleneck with Elastic Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 161-79, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  9. Christopher Avery & Christine Jolls & Richard Posner & Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks," NBER Working Papers 13213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Naor, P, 1969. "The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(1), pages 15-24, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Vickrey, William S, 1969. "Congestion Theory and Transport Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 251-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Barut, Yasar & Kovenock, Dan, 1998. "The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 627-644, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Deacon, Robert T, 1994. "Incomplete Ownership, Rent Dissipation, and the Return to Related Investments," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(4), pages 655-83, October.
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