The curse of the first-in-first-out queue discipline
AbstractWe consider a congested facility where agents can line up at any time they wish after the facility opens (like airplane boarding, or drivers leaving stadium parking lots after a sports event). We show that in Nash equilibrium, within the general family of stochastic queue disciplines with no capacity waste, the focal first-in-first-out (FIFO) queue discipline is the worst while the last-in-first-out (LIFO) discipline is best.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark in its series Discussion Papers of Business and Economics with number 10/2012.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 23 May 2012
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark
Phone: 65 50 32 33
Fax: 65 50 32 37
Web page: http://www.sdu.dk/ivoe
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Bottleneck; queue discipline; Nash equilibrium; FIFO; LIFO; welfare;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-TRE-2012-05-29 (Transport Economics)
- NEP-URE-2012-05-29 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 1983. "?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 146-150, June.
- de Palma, André & Fosgerau, Mogens, 2013.
"Random queues and risk averse users,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 230(2), pages 313-320.
- Vickrey, William S, 1969. "Congestion Theory and Transport Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 251-60, May.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Why LIFO beats FIFO
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2012-06-14 14:10:00
by himaginary in himaginaryの日記 on 2012-06-14 07:00:00
- Breinbjerg, Jesper & Sebald, Alexander & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2014. "Strategic Behavior and Social Outcomes in a Bottleneck Queue: Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark 12/2014, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
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