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What Role of Legal Systems in Financial Intermediation? Theory and Evidence

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Author Info
Laura Bottazzi
Marco Da Rin
Thomas Hellmann

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Abstract

How does the relationship between an investor and entrepreneur depend on the legal system? In a double moral hazard framework, we show how optimal contracts, corporate governance, and investor actions depend on the legal system. With better legal protection, investors give more non-contractible support, demand more downside protection, and exercise more governance. Investors in better legal systems develop stronger governance and support competencies. Therefore, when investing in a different legal systems they behave differently than local investors. We test these predictions using a hand-collected dataset of European venture capital deals. The empirical results confirm the predictions of the model.

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Paper provided by IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University in its series Working Papers with number 283.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:283

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  2. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1788, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  3. Klaus M. Schmidt, 2003. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1139-1166, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Bascha, Andreas & Walz, Uwe, 2001. "Convertible securities and optimal exit decisions in venture capital finance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 285-306, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Laura Bottazzi & Marco da Rin, 2003. "Financing Entrepreneurial Firms in Europe: Facts, Issues, and Research Agenda," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Schindele, Ibolya, 2004. "Advice and Monitoring: Venture Financing with Multiple Tasks," SIFR Research Report Series 29, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Hellmann, Thomas, 2002. "A theory of strategic venture investing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 285-314, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Financial Contracting," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1079-1100, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Kaplan, Steven & Strömberg, Per Johan, 2002. "Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses," CEPR Discussion Papers 3243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Lerner, Josh, 1995. " Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(1), pages 301-18, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, 2002. "Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 169-197, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Thomas Hellman & Laura Lindsey & Manju Puri, 2004. "Building Relationships Early: Banks in Venture Capital," NBER Working Papers 10535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Holmström, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector," IDEI Working Papers 40, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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  17. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Inderst, Roman & Muller, Holger M., 2004. "The effect of capital market characteristics on the value of start-up firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 319-356, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Cumming, Douglas J. & MacIntosh, Jeffrey G., 2003. "A cross-country comparison of full and partial venture capital exits," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 511-548, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Marco Da Rin & Giovanna Nicodano & Alessandro Sembenelli, 2004. "Public Policy and the Creation of Active Venture Capital Markets," Working Papers 270, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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  25. Laura Bottazzi & Marco Da Rin, . "Euro.NM and the Financing of European Innovative Firms," Working Papers 171, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
  26. Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 2004. "Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach," Review of Finance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 75-108. [Downloadable!]
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  27. Hellmann, Thomas, 2006. "IPOs, acquisitions, and the use of convertible securities in venture capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 649-679, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  28. Hellmann, Thomas & Puri, Manju, 2000. "The Interaction between Product Market and Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(4), pages 959-84.
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  31. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2202, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  32. Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, 2005. "Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(1), pages 223-246, January.
  33. Thomas Hellmann, 1998. "The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 57-76, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marco Da Rin & María Fabiana Penas, 2007. "The Effect of Venture Capital on Innovation Strategies," NBER Working Papers 13636, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Laura Bottazzi & Marco Da Rin & Thomas Hellmann, 2007. "The Importance of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Venture Capital," Working Papers 325, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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