This paper provides a theory of venture capital financing based on the complementarity between the financing and advising roles of venture capitalists. We examine the interaction between the staging of investment that characterizes young firms with a high growth potential and the double-sided moral hazard problem that arises from the managerial contributions of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. The optimal contract combines an incentive-related insurance motive that makes the initial financiers bear the start-up's downside risk and a financing motive that protects their claims against dilution. These motives can explain the widespread use of convertible preferred stock in venture capital financing.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
2097.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
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