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Tax Policy for Venture Capital Backed Entrepreneurship

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  • Christian Keuschnigg

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Abstract

Venture capital has become an important source of financing young entrepreneurial firms. Venture capital backed firms are often perceived as more innovative and as creating more value than others. Perhaps for this reason, policy makers are keen to create a good institutional framework to facilitate the development of an active venture capital industry. We explore the role of tax policy in determining the incentives of individuals to start up new firms and of venture capitalists to finance and advise them. In particular, we examine how business taxation at the company and investor level together with start-up capital subsidies affect the volume and quality of venture capital backed entrepreneurship.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen in its series University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2008 with number 2008-07.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:usg:dp2008:2008-07

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Keywords: Entrepreneurship; venture capital; taxes; subsidies;

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