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Taxation of a Venture Capitalist With a Portfolio of Firms

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Author Info
Christian Keuschnigg ()

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Abstract

Venture capitalists not only finance but also advise and thereby add value to young innovative firms. The prospects of venture capital backed firms thus depend on joint efforts of entrepreneurs and informed venture capitalists, and are subject to double moral hazard. In financing a portfolio of firms, venture capitalists additionally face a trade-off between the number of companies and the amount of managerial advice allocated to each individual venture. The paper argues that managerial support and the number of portfolio firms are inefficiently low in private equilibrium. An optimal tax policy is derived that succeeds to move the private equilibrium towards a first best allocation.

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File URL: http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2003/dp0304keuschnigg_ganz.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen in its series University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2003 with number 2003-04.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:usg:dp2003:2003-04

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Web page: http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/
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Related research
Keywords: Venture capital; double moral hazard; optimal taxation.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-14.

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