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Introduction: Funding Gaps

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  • Robert Cressy

    (City University Business School)

Abstract

Theoretical and empirical foundations of government policies to plug alleged business funding gaps are highly controversial but rarely subject to wide-ranging in-depth debate. This symposium from major scholars in the field provides a counterbalance. Topics addressed cover the theory of lending under asymmetric information; its implications for over lending; relationship lending as a market solution to information asymmetries; government emulation of private sector decision-making to eliminate underprovision of high tech equity and theoretically-based empirical work testing for funding deficiencies in the high tech sector. Despite the very different and potentially contradictory contributions the result is, surprisingly, a set of mutually agreed policy conclusions. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2002

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 112 (2002)
Issue (Month): 477 (February)
Pages: F1-F16

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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:112:y:2002:i:477:p:f1-f16

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  1. Steven N. Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities are not Valid Measures of Financing Constraints," NBER Working Papers 7659, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1995. "Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 351-81, July.
  3. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 1998. "The economics of small business finance: the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-15, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  4. Kaplan, Steven N & Zingales, Luigi, 1997. "Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 169-215, February.
  5. Black, Jane & de Meza, David & Jeffreys, David, 1996. "House Price, the Supply of Collateral and the Enterprise Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 60-75, January.
  6. David de Meza, 2002. "Overlending?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages F17-F31, February.
  7. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1997. "Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment," NBER Working Papers 5996, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  9. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
  10. Egeln, Jurgen & Licht, Georg & Steil, Fabian, 1997. " Firm Foundations and the Role of Financial Constraints," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 137-50, April.
  11. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. " The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
  12. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October.
  13. Ritter, Jay R, 1991. " The Long-run Performance of Initial Public Offerings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 3-27, March.
  14. Cressy, Robert, 1996. "Are Business Startups Debt-Rationed?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1253-70, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Mueller, Elisabeth, 2005. "Benefits of Control, Capital Structure and Company Growth," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-55, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  2. Ardic, Oya Pinar & Heimann, Maximilien & Mylenko, Nataliya, 2011. "Access to financial services and the financial inclusion agenda around the world : a cross-country analysis with a new data set," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5537, The World Bank.
  3. André van Stel & Roy Thurik & Ingrid Verheul, 2004. "Explaining female and male entrepreneurship across 29 countries," Scales Research Reports N200403, EIM Business and Policy Research.
  4. Sofia Johan & Dorra Najar, 2011. "The Role of Law, Corruption and Culture in Investment Fund Manager Fees," Post-Print halshs-00639925, HAL.
  5. Najar, Dorra & Johan, Sofia, 2011. "The Role of Corruption, Culture, and Law in Investment Fund Manager Fees," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6239, Paris Dauphine University.
  6. Dorothea Schäfer & Oleksandr Talavera, 2009. "Small business survival and inheritance: evidence from Germany," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 95-109, January.
  7. Karel Janda, 2008. "Which Government Interventions Are Good in Alleviating Credit Market Failures?," Working Papers IES 2008/12, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2008.
  8. Ingrid Verheul & Andre van Stel & Roy Thurik, 2005. "Explaining female and male entrepreneurship at the country level," Papers on Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy 2005-34, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy Group.
  9. Cumming, D. & Johan, S.A., 2005. "Provincial preferences in private equity," Discussion Paper 2005-004, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  10. Christian Keuschnigg, 2008. "Tax Policy for Venture Capital Backed Entrepreneurship," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2008 2008-07, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.

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