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Where are you from? Cultural Differences in Public Good Experiments

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  • Massimo Finocchiaro Castro

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London)

Abstract

We study the effect of cultural differences on contributions in a public good experiment, analysing real-time interactions between Italian and British subjects in their home countries. In the first treatment, subjects play in nationally-homogeneous groups. In the second treatment, Italian and British subjects play in heterogeneous groups, knowing the nationality of the group members. In the third treatment, we control for a possible “country effect” by giving players no information on nationality. The data suggest that, in homogeneous groups, British subjects contribute significantly more to the public good; contributions are lower in heterogeneous groups; there is no country effect.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London in its series Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics with number 06/03.

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Date of creation: Jun 2006
Date of revision: Jun 2006
Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0603

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Web page: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/

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Keywords: public goods; experiments; real time interactions; cultural differences;

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References

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  1. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-88, November.
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  3. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2005. "Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange," 2005 Meeting Papers 234, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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  6. Ruffle, Bradley J. & Sosis, Richard, 2006. "Cooperation and the in-group-out-group bias: A field test on Israeli kibbutz members and city residents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 147-163, June.
  7. Hessel Oosterbeek & Randolph Sloof & Gijs van de Kuilen, 2004. "Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 171-188, 06.
  8. Fershtman, C. & Gneezy, U., 2000. "Discrimination in a Segmented Society: an Experimental Approach," Papers 2000-9, Tel Aviv.
  9. Swee Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann & Martin Jones & Geoffrey Williams, 2004. "Do Cultures Clash? Evidence from Cross-National Ultimatum Game Experiments," Occasional Papers 9, Industrial Economics Division.
  10. Gerxhani, Klarita & Schram, Arthur, 2006. "Tax evasion and income source: A comparative experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 402-422, June.
  11. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, 2001. "Auctions and fair division games - a cross-country bidding experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 367-374.
  12. Willinger, Marc & Keser, Claudia & Lohmann, Christopher & Usunier, Jean-Claude, 2003. "A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 447-466, August.
  13. Roberto Burlando & John Hey, . "Do Anglo-Saxons Free-Ride More?," Discussion Papers 95/37, Department of Economics, University of York.
  14. Nancy J Adler & John L Graham, 1989. "Cross-Cultural Interaction: The International Comparison Fallacy?," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(3), pages 515-537, September.
  15. Catherine Eckel & Rick Wilson, 2006. "Internet cautions: Experimental games with internet partners," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 53-66, April.
  16. Nancy Buchan & Rachel Croson, 1999. "Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 386-391, May.
  17. Frohlich, Norman & Oppenheimer, Joe & Bernard Moore, J., 2001. "Some doubts about measuring self-interest using dictator experiments: the costs of anonymity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 271-290, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Faillo, Marco & Grieco, Daniela & Zarri, Luca, 2012. "Cultural Diversity, Cooperation,and Anti-social Punishment," AICCON Working Papers 102-2012, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
  2. Swee Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann & Martin Jones & Geoffrey Williams, 2005. "An Economic Anatomy of Culture: Attitudes and Behaviour in Inter- and Intra- National Ultimatum Game Experiments," Occasional Papers 13, Industrial Economics Division.
  3. Horak, Sven, 2013. "Cross-cultural experimental economics and indigenous management research: Issues and contributions," Duisburger Arbeitspapiere Ostasienwissenschaften 92/2013, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of East Asian Studies IN-EAST.
  4. Giacomo Degli Antoni & Gianluca Grimalda, 2013. "The value of real voluntary associations," Working Papers 2013/20, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
  5. Keuschnigg, Marc & Schikora, Jan, 2014. "The dark side of leadership: An experiment on religious heterogeneity and cooperation in India," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 19-26.
  6. Smith, Alexander, 2011. "Group composition and conditional cooperation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 616-622.

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