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Cooperation and the In-Group-Out-Group Bias: A Field Test on Israeli Kibbutz Members and City Residents

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Author Info
Bradley J. Ruffle (Ben-Gurion University & Harvard Business School)
Richard H. Sosis (University of Connecticut)

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Abstract

The in-group-out-group bias is among the most well documented and widely observed phenomenon in the social sciences. Despite its role in hiring decisions and job discrimination, negotiations, and conflict and competition between groups, economists have heretofore ignored the in- group-out-group bias. We question the universality of the bias by designing field experiments to test whether it extends to the cooperative behavior of one of the most successful and best-known modern collective societies, the Israeli kibbutz. The facts that kibbutz members have voluntarily chosen their lifestyle of cooperation and egalitarianism, the ease with which they could join the surrounding capitalist society, their disproportionate involvement in social and national causes and their revealed willingness to sacrifice for the benefit of Israeli society as a whole suggest that if ever there was a society of individuals whose cooperativeness extends equally to members and non-members, the kibbutz is it. Nonetheless, the findings from our field experiments indicate that kibbutz members display higher levels of cooperation when paired with anonymous kibbutz members than when paired with city residents. In fact, when paired with city residents, kibbutz members’ observed levels of cooperation are identical to those displayed by the city residents. Moreover, we present evidence that kibbutz socialization actually damages the willingness of members to cooperate with one another.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Experimental with number 0310002.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 05 Oct 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0310002

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Related research
Keywords: cooperation; in-group-out-group bias; field experiment; self- selection; socialization; kibbutz;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
P32 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Collectives; Communes; Agricultural Institutions

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jeffrey P. Carpenter, 2000. "Negotiation in the Commons: Incorporating Field and Experimental Evidence into a Theory of Local Collective Action," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(4), pages 661-, December.
  2. Chaim Fershtman & Uri Gneezy, 2001. "Discrimination In A Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 351-377, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Schram, Arthur, 2000. " Sorting Out the Seeking: The Economics of Individual Motivations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 231-58, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2000. "Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1719-1733, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Richard Sosis & Bradley Ruffle, 2004. "Does It Pay To Pray? Evaluating the Economic Return to Religious Ritual," Artefactual Field Experiments 0074, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Bernd Hayo & Björn Vollan, 2009. "Individual Heterogeneity, Group Interaction, and Co-operative Behaviour: Evidence from a Common-Pool Resource Experiment in South Africa and Namibia," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200917, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
  3. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2006. "Where are you from? Cultural Differences in Public Good Experiments," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 06/03, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Klor, Esteban F & Shayo, Moses, 2007. "Social Identity and Preferences over Redistribution," CEPR Discussion Papers 6406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Camille Chaserant, 2006. "Minimal group identity and gender in ultimatum games," EconomiX Working Papers 2006-13, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
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