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Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: An International Comparison

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Author Info
Timothy Cason ()
Tatsuyoshi Saijo ()
Takehiko Yamato ()

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Abstract

This paper studies voluntary public good provision in the laboratory, in a cross-cultural experiment conducted in the United States and Japan. Our environment differs from the standard voluntary contribution mechanism because subjects first decide whether or not to participate in providing this non-excludable public good. This participation decision is conveyed to the other subject prior to the subjects' contribution decisions. We find that only the American data are consistent with the evolutionary-stable-strategy Nash equilibrium predictions, and that behavior is significantly different across countries. Japanese subjects are more likely to act spitefully in the early periods of the experiment, even though our design changes subject pairings each period so that no two subjects ever interact twice. Surprisingly, this spiteful behavior eventually leads to more efficient public good contributions for Japanese subjects than for American subjects. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1020317321607
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 5 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 133-153
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Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:5:y:2002:i:2:p:133-153

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Related research
Keywords: fairness; other regarding preferences; subject pools; culture;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. repec:att:wimass:1919994 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko, 1999. "A Voluntary Participation Game with a Non-excludable Public Good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 227-242, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. John Duffy & Nick Feltovich, 1997. "Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 592, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Brandts, J. & Saijo, T. & Schram, A., 2000. "A Four Country Comparision of Spite, Cooperation and Errors in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms," Papers 496, Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research.
  5. Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Discussion Paper 37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 1999. "Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model," Economics Working Papers 441, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2000. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Prasnikar, Vesna & Roth, Alvin E, 1992. "Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 865-88, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Saijo, T. & Yamato, T. & Yokotani, K. & Cason, T.N., 2000. "Voluntary Participation Game Experiments with a Non-Excludable Public Good: Is Spitefulness a Source of Cooperation?," Papers 494, Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research.
  11. Glenn W. Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer, 1988. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest-Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," UCLA Economics Working Papers 473, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Rachel Croson & Nancy Buchan, 1999. "Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 386-391, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Beard, T Randolph & Beil, Richard O, Jr & Mataga, Yoshiharu, 2001. "Reliant Behavior in the United States and Japan," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 270-79, April.
  14. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-99, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Andreoni, James & Brown, Paul M. & Vesterlund, Lise, 2002. "What Makes an Allocation Fair? Some Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Cason, T.N. & Saijo, T. & Yamato, T., 1998. "Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: an International Comparison," Papers 98-002, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER).
    Other versions:
  18. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 1999. "When Culture does not matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-043/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  20. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Hideki Nakamura, 2001. "The 'Spite' Dilemma in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000155, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Brown, James N & Rosenthal, Robert W, 1990. "Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-examination of O'Neill's Game Experiment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1065-81, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Kachelmeier, Steven J. & Shehata, Mohamed, 1992. "Culture and competition: A laboratory market comparison between China and the West," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 145-168, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Robert Jiro Netzer & Matthias Sutter, 2009. "Intercultural trust. An experiment in Austria and Japan," Working Papers 2009-05, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  2. Anabela Botelho & Mark A. Hirsch & Elisabet E. Rutstrom, 2000. "Culture, nationality and demographics in ultimatum games," Working Papers 7, Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho. [Downloadable!]
  3. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2006. "Where are you from? Cultural Differences in Public Good Experiments," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 06/03, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
  4. Arthur J.H.C. Schram, 2002. "Experimental Public Choice," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-106/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Junyi Shen & Xiangdong Qin & Kenju Akai, 2007. "The Spite Dilemma Revisited: Comparison between Chinese and Japanese," OSIPP Discussion Paper 07E004, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  6. James Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2004. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental 0406001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Timothy Cason & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehiko Yamato, 2002. "Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: An International Comparison," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 133-153, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 1999. "When Culture does not matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-043/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  9. Tanner, Mariah & Lusk, Jayson & Tyner, Wallace, 2005. "A Multidimensional Homo Economicus: Cultural Dimensions of Economic Preferences in Four Countries," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19225, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  10. Croson, Rachel & Konow, James, 2007. "Double Standards: Social Preferences and Moral Biases," MPRA Paper 2729, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  11. Todd Kaplan & Bradley Ruffle, 2004. "It's My Turn ... Please, After You: An Experimental Study of Cooperation and Social Conventions," Experimental 0410001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  12. Heijden, E. van der & Moxnes, E., 1999. "Information feedback in public-bad games : a cross-country experiment," Discussion Paper 102, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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