Reliant Behavior in the United States and Japan
AbstractJapanese economic success is often attributed to culturally reinforced psychological conditioning that promotes interpersonal reliance, cooperation, and a group interest orientation. This article provides direct experimental evidence on differences in behavior among future businesspeople in the United States and Japan. Utilizing a simple, two person extensive form game of perfect information introduced by Selten (1975), we provide evidence that, contrary to some views, the Japanese can be less reliant on the behavior of others and are more likely to take actions at variance with group welfare in some settings. Thus, popular explanations of Japanese economic achievements may require further exploration. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 39 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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