A Model of Union Formation
AbstractIn an analysis of the formation of unions within a single firm, this paper addresses conditions under which encompassing unions form. It is shown that a production function satisfying decreasing marginal productivity leads to the formation of encompassing unions. This result holds for different ways of dividing the surplus within the union. The effects of changes in heterogeneity, e.g. increased demand for skilled labor, are also analyzed. In the most reasonable setup, a change in heterogeneity does not affect the decision whether to form a union or not. This contrasts with the result in Jun (1989).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 1999:8.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 03 Jun 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC
Union; Heterogeneity; Labor;
Other versions of this item:JEL classification:
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-1999-07-28 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MIC-1999-07-28 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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