Constitutional Property Rights Protection and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition
AbstractAbstract: This paper seeks to estimate the economic growth effect of constitutional provisions for property rights protection. It does so using the unique situation in formerly communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus where all but two introduced new constitutions after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The effects of implementing different constitutional provisions can therefore be observed in a group of countries with the same formal starting point. Estimates provide no evidence of positive effects and mainly point towards a negative conclusion: the introduction of constitutional protection of property rights is not associated with economic development in the long run, but tends to impose costs during a period of institutional transition and implementation proportional to the constitutional change.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number 189.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 20 Mar 2012
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
property rights; constitutional political economy; transition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- P37 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2012-03-28 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2012-03-28 (Transition Economics)
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- Voigt, Stefan & Gutmann, Jerg, 2013. "Turning cheap talk into economic growth: On the relationship between property rights and judicial independence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 66-73.
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