Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov () (The Ratio Institute) Hellström, Jörgen (Department of Economics, Umeå University) Landström, Mats (Department of Economics, University of Gävle)
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This paper is a first empirical attempt to investigate why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to fine-tune the economy. A new data-set covering 132 countries, of which 89 countries had implemented such reforms, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country has been characterized by a high variability in historical inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD-countries.
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Paper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number
143.
Length: 43 pages Date of creation: 07 Oct 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0143
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions;
Property Rights
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Alberto Alesina, 1988.
"Macroeconomics and Politics,"
NBER Chapters,
in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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