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Playing with the Good Guys: A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation

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Author Info

  • Brekke, Kjell Arne

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Hauge, Karen Evely

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Lind, Jo Thori

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Nyborg, Karine

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

Abstract

In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start o high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will selfselect into groups committed to charitable giving. Testing this experimentally, we let subjects choose between two group types, where one type donate a xed amount to a charity. Contributions in these groups stayed high, whereas contributions in the other groups showed the well known declining pattern. One implication is that corporate social responsibility may attract more responsible employees.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 08/2009.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 17 Apr 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2009_008

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Email:
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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Keywords: Altruism; conditional cooperation; self-selection;

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References

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  1. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter, 2006. "Heterogeneous social preferences and the dynamics of free riding in public goods," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2006-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  2. Ones, Umut & Putterman, Louis, 2007. "The ecology of collective action: A public goods and sanctions experiment with controlled group formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 495-521, April.
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  6. Brekke, Kjell Arne & Nyborg, Karine, 2008. "Attracting responsible employees: Green production as labor market screening," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 509-526, December.
  7. Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March.
  8. Anna Gunnthorsdottir & Daniel Houser & Kevin McCabe & Holly Ameden, 2004. "Disposition, History and Contributions in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental, EconWPA 0401001, EconWPA.
  9. Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 772-87, December.
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  15. Blanco, Mariana & Engelmann, Dirk & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2010. "A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences," DICE Discussion Papers 06, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Lorenzo Cerda Planas, 2014. "Moving to Greener Societies: Moral Motivation and Green Behaviour," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01018651, HAL.
  2. Jacobsen, Karin J. & Eika, Kari H. & Helland, Leif & Lind, Jo Thori & Nyborg, Karine, 2011. "Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 818-831.
  3. Fehrler, Sebastian & Kosfeld, Michael, 2013. "Can You Trust the Good Guys? Trust Within and Between Groups with Different Missions," IZA Discussion Papers 7411, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Cherry, Josh & Salant, Stephen & Uler, Neslihan, 2013. "Experimental Departures from Self-Interest when Competing Partnerships Share Output," Discussion Papers, Resources For the Future dp-13-07, Resources For the Future.
  5. Lorenzo Cerda Planas, 2014. "Moving to Greener Societies: Moral Motivation and Green Behaviour," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14035, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  6. Martin Beckenkamp & Christoph Engel & Andreas Glöckner & Bernd Irlenbusch & Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Sebastian Kube & Michael Kurschilgen & Alexander Morell & Andreas Nicklisch & Hans-Theo Normann & Ema, 2009. "First Impressions are More Important than Early Intervention Qualifying Broken Windows Theory in the Lab," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_21, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Jan 2013.
  7. Menusch Khadjavi & Jasper D. Tjaden, 2014. "Setting the Bar - An Experimental Investigation of Immigration Requirements," Kiel Working Papers 1939, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  8. John Duffy & Jonathan Lafky, 2014. "Birth, Death and Public Good Provision," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 520, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2014.
  9. Maren Bachke & Frode Alfnes & Mette Wik, 2012. "Eliciting donor preferences," Artefactual Field Experiments 00098, The Field Experiments Website.
  10. Christoph Engel & Sebastian Kube & Michael Kurschilgen, 2011. "Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experimental study on “Broken (and Fixed) Windows”," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

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