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Do the Reciprocal Trust Less? Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Steffen Altmann () (University of Bonn and IZA)
Thomas Dohmen () (IZA)
Matthias Wibral () (University of Bonn and IZA)
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We study the intrapersonal relationship between trust and reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. Reciprocal subjects trust significantly more than selfish ones. This finding raises questions about theories of social preferences which predict that "fairer" players should trust less.
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number
3010.
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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2007Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3010Contact details of provider: Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany Phone: +49 228 3894 223 Fax: +49 228 3894 180 Web page: http://www.iza.org
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Keywords: trust ; reciprocity ; social preferences ; fairness ; laboratory experiment ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Kjell Arne Brekke & Karen Evelyn Hauge & Jo Thori Lind & Karine Nyborg, 2009.
"Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
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Other versions: Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Elke Renner & Martin Sefton, 2009.
"Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
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Gächter, Simon & Nosenzo, Daniele & Renner, Elke & Sefton, Martin, 2008.
"Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example ,"
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"Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example ,"
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2008-16, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
[Downloadable!]
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