Beyond Procedural Fairness and Reciprocity
AbstractMost research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other's intentions while they have different outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of their moral judgment.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics in its series SITE Working Paper Series with number 3.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 13 Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: (+46 8) 736 9670
Fax: (+46 8) 31 64 22
Web page: http://www.hhs.se/site/
More information through EDIRC
procedural preferences; experiment; procedural fairness;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-35, November.
- Barry Sopher & Edi Karni & Tim Salmon, 2001.
"Individual Sense of Fairness: An Experimental Study,"
Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics
200107, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Edi Karni & Tim Salmon & Barry Sopher, 2008. "Individual sense of fairness: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 174-189, June.
- G. Bolton, 2010.
"A comparative model of bargaining: theory and evidence,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
263, David K. Levine.
- Bolton, Gary E, 1991. "A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1096-136, December.
- Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, 2001.
"A Theory of Reciprocity,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
457, CESifo Group Munich.
- Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001. "A Theory of Reciprocity," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, . "A Theory of Reciprocity," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 006, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004.
"A theory of sequential reciprocity,"
ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles
2013/5899, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1998-37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Margin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2001. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000090, David K. Levine.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, 2002. "Individual Sense of Justice: A Utility Representation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(1), pages 263-284, January.
- Gary E Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Axel Ockenfels, 2005.
"Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1054-1076, October.
- Gary E. Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "Fair Procedures. Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (UAB) and Institut d'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (CSIC) 483.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- James Konow, 2003. "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1188-1239, December.
- Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Evelina Bonnier).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.