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Performance Management In The Public Sector:

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Author Info

  • Guillaume Biot-Paquerot

    ()
    (CEREGE - CEntre de REcherche en sciences de GEstion - CNRS : EA1722 - Groupe Sup de Co La Rochelle)

  • Jean-Luc Rossignol

    ()
    (CUREGE - Centre universitaire de recherche en gestion - Université de Franche-Comté)

Abstract

Education supply in universities of most European countries has for the last ten years become a strategic matter. At present, French universities consider education supply as an investment. But they do not utilize all incentive mechanisms in order to drive their strategies. At the beginning of the year 2006, the public sector reform will tend to impose performance measurements of research and educational activities, in order to improve organizational efficiency. The aim of this reform in the French context is to provide driving elements to increase internal efficiency, social and economic impact of higher education system and to reinforce international attractiveness of public education institutions. The substitution of resources management by result management involves an agent's performance responsibility measurement. Evaluation becomes a central factor and is articulated with incentives system. The weakening of the property right system drives project bearers to maximize their utility instead of their incomes. In such a context, the understanding of individual strategies permits to understand constraints of management within universities, and to take into account the impact of stakeholders who take part in the value generation process. The major risk is to constraint the utility function of projects bearers by increasing their burden and their motivation. The result could be the limitation of the number of projects, and as well, the decreasing of university investments.

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File URL: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/13/72/00/PDF/Article_EAA_2006_GBP_JLR.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00137200.

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Date of creation: 20 Mar 2006
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Publication status: Published - Presented, EAA, 2006, Dublin, Ireland
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00137200

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00137200/en/
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Related research

Keywords: performance; public sector; universities; efficiency; value generation;

References

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  1. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-49, June.
  2. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Charles T. Clotfelter, 1999. "The Familiar but Curious Economics of Higher Education: Introduction to a Symposium," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 3-12, Winter.
  4. Willam O. Brown, 1997. "University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property Rights Explanation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(3), pages 441-, September.
  5. McCormick, Robert E & Meiners, Roger E, 1988. "University Governance: A Property Rights Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 423-42, October.
  6. Gordon C. Winston, 1997. "Why Can't a College be More Like a Firm?," Williams Project on the Economics of Higher Education DP-42, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  7. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
  8. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
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