University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property Rights Explanation
AbstractThis paper provides an efficiency-based explanation for several features of university governance including academic tenure. In this model, tenure is part of a broader system of organizational governance where the non-profit status of the university requires faculty members to evaluate and monitor both university administrators and trustees. The nature of the employment contract provides the incentives for the faculty to behave as residual claimants. Tenure is necessary for faculty to be willing to assume the roles normally associated with ownership without fear or reprisal from trustees and administrators.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 153 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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