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University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property Rights Explanation

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Author Info
Willam O. Brown
Abstract

This paper provides an efficiency-based explanation for several features of university governance including academic tenure. In this model, tenure is part of a broader system of organizational governance where the non-profit status of the university requires faculty members to evaluate and monitor both university administrators and trustees. The nature of the employment contract provides the incentives for the faculty to behave as residual claimants. Tenure is necessary for faculty to be willing to assume the roles normally associated with ownership without fear or reprisal from trustees and administrators.

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File URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mohr/jite/1997/00000153/00000003/art00001
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 153 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 441-
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Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199709)153:3_441:ugaata_2.0.tx_2-z

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

Cited by:
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  1. Guillaume Biot-Paquerot & Jean-Luc Rossignol, 2006. "Performance Management In The Public Sector:," Post-Print hal-00137200_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  2. Heining, Jörg & Jerger, Jürgen & Lingens, Jörg, 2007. "Success in the academic labour market for economists - the German experience," Regensburger Diskussionsbeiträge zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 422, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. William O. Brown, Jr., . "Faculty Participation in University Governance and the Effects on University Performance," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-25, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  4. Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen, 2000. "Term Length and the Quality of Appointments," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Biot-Paquerot, Guillaume, 2006. "Organes de gouvernance et paradoxe démocratique: Le cas des conseils d’administration d’université
    [Democratic paradox and governance mediums: the case of university boards]    ," MPRA Paper 2302, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. J. Stephen Ferris & Michael McKee, 2002. "Measuring Academic Potential: A Case for Academic Tenure and Process," Carleton Economic Papers 02-06, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen, 2007. "Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 55-69, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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