Efficacité Du Système D'Évaluation Public : Le Cas Des Universités
Abstract
L'attribution de moyens supplémentaires dans les universités dépend quasi exclusivement du maintien ou de la création de nouvelles filières de formation. Le recours à la cogestion peut à cet égard entraîner un certain nombre de dysfonctionnements. Les décisions émergent généralement des disciplines, et sont contrôlées au niveau des conseils des établissements par des représentants de ces disciplines, puis au niveau de la tutelle par un expert de la discipline. Ce qui implique que certaines parties prenantes sont à même d'utiliser les informations qu'elles détiennent par rapport à ces projets d'investissement afin de s'aménager un budget discrétionnaire, entraînant alors de potentiels conflits d'intérêts entre les membres de la coalition. Cet article nous permettra d'éclairer, au travers de la mise à l'épreuve de la théorie de l'architecture organisationnelle par le biais d'une étude de cas, la nécessité du renforcement de la fonction d'évaluation au sein des universités, afin de remplir les objectifs fixés lors de la Conférence de Bologne sur l'Enseignement supérieur européen.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00543212.Length:
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published - Presented, «COMPTABILITE ET ENVIRONNEMENT », 2007, France
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00543212
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00543212/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Related research
Keywords: Gouvernance des universités; management public; création de valeur; études de cas;References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972.
"Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December.
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001.
"The Firm As A Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory Of The Origins And Growth Of Firms,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 805-851, August.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms," NBER Working Papers 7546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-49, June.
- Jensen, Michael C, 1993.
" The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 831-80, July.
- Michael C. Jensen, 1994. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, And The Failure Of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 6(4), pages 4-23.
- Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 43-58.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Willam O. Brown, 1997. "University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property Rights Explanation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(3), pages 441-, September.
- Gordon C. Winston, 1997. "Why Can't a College be More Like a Firm?," Williams Project on the Economics of Higher Education DP-42, Department of Economics, Williams College.
Citations
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00543212For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

