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Zur Funktion von Topmanagement-Beratungen als Karrieresprungsbrett für High Potentials

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  • Egon Franck
  • Torsten Pudack
  • Christian Opitz

    ()
    (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich
    Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich
    TU Bergakademie Freiberg)

Abstract

Due to specific production conditions consultancies have advantages over firms from other industries in assessing the quality of human capital. But only top-management-consulting firms will economize on these advantages by offering filtering services to the labor market. We assume top-management-consulting to be a credence good, whose quality cannot be signaled via reputation. However, production technology makes the human capital of any consultant observable to his clients. Being the only im-portant input factor into the production process high quality human capital may serve as a valid signal for high quality consulting. In our argument superior possibilities and strong incentives of top-management-consulting firms to perform filtering services hold as an explanation for their strong position among the most successful recruiters of high potentials. Using such filtering services in an otherwise pooled labor market is benefi-cial to both, high potentials and their employers.

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File URL: http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/ISU_WPS/3_ISU_full.pdf
File Function: First version, 2001
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) in its series Working Papers with number 0003.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0003

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