Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments
AbstractTop decision-makers (such as the U.S. President) often serve short terms, but make decisions with consequences long after they are gone. (Appointments of judges or of Federal Reserve Board members are two examples.) When a leader can choose his effort on an appointment, the organization’s performance may increase when the minimum term for an appointment increases, and when decisions are irreversible. In addition, ideological preferences can lead to better appointments. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.
Volume (Year): 14 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915
Appointments; Tenure; Effort; Ideology;
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