Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov () (The Swedish Retail Institute (HUI)) Hellström, Jörgen () (Department of Economics) Landström, Mats () (Department of Economics)
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It is something of a puzzle that politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their possibilities to fine-tune the economy. In this paper the determinants of central bank independence (CBI) reforms are studied using a new data set on the possible event of such reforms in 119 countries. According to the data, as much as 81 countries had implemented CBI-reforms during the study period. The results indicate, moreover, that policymakers are more likely to delegate power to independent central banks when the foreign debt is relatively high. In non-OECD countries, the likelihood of a CBI-reform also seems to increase when policymakers face a high probability of getting replaced.
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Paper provided by The Swedish Retail Institute (HUI) in its series HUI Working Papers with number
13.
Length: 34 pages Date of creation: 29 Feb 2008 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:huiwps:0013
Contact details of provider: Postal: The Swedish Retail Institute (HUI), Regeringsgatan 60, 103 29 Stockholm, Sweden Phone: +46 (0)8 762 72 80 Fax: +46 (0)8 679 76 06 Email: Web page: http://www.hui.se/ More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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