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Regulation by Prices and by Command

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  • Glazer, Amihai
  • Lave, Charles

Abstract

Standard economic theory states that regulation by price is more efficient than regulation by command and control. Exceptions may arise of regulators have good knowledge of the supply curve. In practice, though, governments usually regulate by command and control, and do so when there is uncertainty about the technology of supply. We show that government may prefer to regulate by command and control when it cares about the investment decisions of a firm.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of California Transportation Center in its series University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers with number qt6bs9v6wk.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 1995
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:uctcwp:qt6bs9v6wk

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Keywords: Social and Behavioral Sciences;

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  1. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March.
  2. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  3. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 2759, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Pindyck, Robert S, 1991. "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 29(3), pages 1110-48, September.
  5. Thomas A. Barthold, 1994. "Issues in the Design of Environmental Excise Taxes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 133-151, Winter.
  6. Glazer, Amihai, 1989. "Politics and the Choice of Durability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1207-13, December.
  7. Chao, Hung-Po & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Option Value of Emission Allowances," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 233-49, September.
  8. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Avinash Dixit, 1992. "Investment and Hysteresis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 107-132, Winter.
  10. M. L. Weitzman, 1973. "Prices vs. Quantities," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 106, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  11. Goodwin, Thomas H. & Patrick, Robert H., 1992. "Capital recovery for the regulated firm under certainty and regulatory uncertainty," Resources and Energy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 337-361, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Ioulia Ossokina & Otto Swank, 2008. "Adoption Subsidy Versus Technology Standards Under Asymmetric Information," De Economist, Springer, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 241-267, September.
  2. St├ęphanie Souche & Charles Raux, 2006. "Perception of the fairness of pricing," Post-Print, HAL halshs-00109055, HAL.
  3. Charles Raux & St├ęphanie Souche & Yves Croissant, 2009. "How fair is pricing perceived to be? An empirical study," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 227-240, April.
  4. Van Dender, Kurt, 2009. "Energy policy in transport and transport policy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 3854-3862, October.

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