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Abstract

We try to provide an historical approach of the construction process of a corporate governance framework. We expose simultaneously the remarkable stability of themes and the permanence of underlying problems. As a result, the corporate governance framework is still under discussion, and its theoretical foundations or practices can also be criticized. Nous proposons une approche historique du processus d'élaboration de la théorie de la gouvernance. Il s'agit d'exposer simultanément la remarquable stabilité des thèmes de fond abordés et la permanence de problèmes sous-jacents. Il en résulte un processus constant de discussion et de critique des fondements théoriques et pratiques de la gouvernance.

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File URL: http://leg2.u-bourgogne.fr/wp/1021201.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 1021201.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1021201

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
Phone: +33(0)380395435
Fax: +33(0)380395488
Web page: http://leg2.u-bourgogne.fr/

Order Information:
Postal: Gérard Charreaux, Fargo-Leg, Université de Bourgogne 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

Related research

Keywords: governance; stakeholders; value creation; allocation; institutions; paradigm; scientific process gouvernance; partenaires; création de valeur; répartition; institutions; paradigme; processus scientifique;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
• G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
• G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
• B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
• D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
• D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
• L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

References

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1. Stanley Garstka & William Goetzmann, 1999. "The Development Of Corporate Performance Measures: Benchmarks Before EVA," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm121, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jan 2001.
2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
   
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
3. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Heckling, 1995. "Specific And General Knowledge, And Organizational Structure," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 8(2), pages 4-18.
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5. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, . "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CRSP working papers 335, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
   
   • Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power In A Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432, May.
   • Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 1777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 6274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
6. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-49, June.
7. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   
   • Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June.
   • Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
8. Carine Catelin & Céline Chatelin, 2001. "Privatisation, gouvernement d'entreprise et processus décisionnel:une intégration de la dynamique organisationnelle à travers le cas de France Télécom," Working Papers FARGO 1010501, Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
9. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1997. "Gouvernance des entreprises:valeur partenariale contre valeur actionnariale," Working Papers FARGO 0970801, Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
   
   • Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1998. "Gouvernance des entreprises:valeur partenariale contre valeur actionnariale," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 1(2), pages 57-88, June.
10. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
11. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 1994. "The Nature Of Man," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 7(2), pages 4-19.
12. Gérard Charreaux, 2001. "Variation sur le thème 'A la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise'," Working Papers FARGO 011201, Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance), revised Jul 2002.
    
    • Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Variation sur le thème:"À la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise"," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(3), pages 5-68, September.
13. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
14. Williamson, Oliver E, 1999. "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 306-42, April.

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