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Jalons pour une histoire des théories du gouvernement des entreprises

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  • Pierre-Yves Gomez

    (EM Lyon)

Abstract

(VF)Si l'histoire du gouvernement des entreprises commence à être mieux connue, il importe de comprendre comment l'évolution des théories a épousé cette histoire au fur et à mesure qu'il se modifiait. Dans cet article, nous cherchons à comprendre plus précisément, comment ces théories ont rendu compte de l'étendue et de la limitation, au cours du temps, du pouvoir discrétionnaire du dirigeant. Successivement nous montrons comment la théorie des droits de propriété puis la théorie de l'agence ont répondu aux défis posés soit par les pratiques en cours soit par les critiques portées par des théories concurrentes. Nous concluons que les évolutions récentes du gouvernement des entreprises, dues à la massification de l'actionnariat, rendent nécessaire un renouvellement théorique, dont nous repérons les principales pistes. (VA) The history of Corporate governance systems is now well-documented. However, it is necessary to better understand the link between the use of theories and the evolution of effective practices of governance. In this paper, we show that the development of theories (property rights, agency theory) parallels the evolution of the governance of capitalist corporations. We describe three main periods. In each period, economic theories offer rational frameworks to allow and to limit the discretionary power of executives. They answer the need for both understanding the governance systems and legitimating practices in use. Therefore, we show how the recent evolution of corporate governance since the 70's, challenges the use of the agency theory as the mainstream model and paves the way for new theorizations of corporate governance in the mass ownership era.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Yves Gomez, 2003. "Jalons pour une histoire des théories du gouvernement des entreprises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 6(4), pages 183-208, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:6:y:2003:i:q4:p:183-208
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Blanche Segrestin & Armand Hatchuel, 2011. "Autorité de gestion et avaries communes-pour un complément du droit de l’entreprise?," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 14(2), pages 9-36., June.
    3. Marion Dieudonné, 2016. "Credit, Shares And Goodwill: A Veblenian Trinity," Working Papers hal-01264730, HAL.
    4. Peter Wirtz & Odile Paulus & Patrice Charlier, 2012. "La gouvernance des Dominicains au-delà des théories établies," Working Papers halshs-00691233, HAL.
    5. Peter Wirtz, 2008. "L’institutionnalisation croissante du discours sur les «meilleures pratiques» de gouvernance en France:un état des lieux," Working Papers CREGO 1080602, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    6. Xavier Hollandts & Bertrand Valiorgue, 2019. "La gouvernance de médiation comme réponse aux impasses conceptuelles et pratiques de la gouvernance actionnariale," Post-Print hal-03041045, HAL.
    7. Katia Lobre & Jean-Baptiste Cartier, 2012. "Mutualisme bancaire, Hétérosis organisationnelle et difficultés de gouvernance," Post-Print halshs-00696908, HAL.
    8. Domin, Jean-Paul, 2015. "Réformer l’hôpital comme une entreprise. Les errements de trente ans de politique hospitalière (1983-2013)," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 17.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    gouvernement d'entreprise; théorie de l'agence; théorie des droits de propriété; histoire des entreprises; corporate governance; agency theory; property rights theory; business history.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • M20 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - General

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