Bargaining over public goods
Abstract
In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent to the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.Download Info
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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00289435.Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00289435
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Related research
Keywords: Public goods; bargaining; alternating offers.;Other versions of this item:
- Julio D�Vila & Jan Eeckhout & César Martinelli, 2009. "Bargaining over Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 927-945, December.
- Julio Davila & Jan Eeckhout & C. Martinelli, 2009. "Bargaining over Public Goods," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00633592, HAL.
- Davila Muro, Julio, 2009. "Bargaining over public goods," Open Access publications from Université catholique de Louvain info:hdl:2078.1/29163, Université catholique de Louvain.
- Julio Davila & Jan Eeckhout & César Martinelli, 2008. "Bargaining over public goods," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne b08041, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Julio Davila & Jan Eeckhout & Cesar Martinelli, 2009. "Bargaining Over Public Goods," Working Papers 0901, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-07-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2008-07-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2008-07-05 (Public Economics)
References
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- Julio Davila & Jan Eeckhout, 2004. "Competitive Bargaining Equilibria," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04067, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Ana, MAULEON & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2005.
"Market Integration and Strike Activity,"
Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques)
2005025, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2010. "Market integration and strike activity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 154-161, May.
- MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2005. "Market integration and strike activity," CORE Discussion Papers 2005036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Mauleon, Ana, 2010. "Market integration and strike activity," Open Access publications from Université catholique de Louvain info:hdl:2078.1/32315, Université catholique de Louvain.
- MAULEON, Ana & SONG, Huasheng & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2006.
"Networks of free trade agreements among heterogeneous countries,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2006053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ana Mauleon & Huasheng Song & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2010. "Networks of Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 471-500, 06.
- Ana, MAULEON & Huasheng, SONG & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2006. "Networks for Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006029, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Mauleon, Ana, 2010. "Networks of free trade agreements among heterogeneous countries," Open Access publications from Université catholique de Louvain info:hdl:2078.1/32314, Université catholique de Louvain.
- Thisse, Jacques-François, 2010. "Toward a unified theory of economic geography an urban economics," Open Access publications from Université catholique de Louvain info:hdl:2078.1/30406, Université catholique de Louvain.
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