Bargaining over public goods
AbstractIn a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent to the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.
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Date of creation: Jun 2008
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Public goods; bargaining; alternating offers.;
Other versions of this item:
- Julio Davila & Jan Eeckhout & Cesar Martinelli, 2009. "Bargaining Over Public Goods," Working Papers 0901, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- DAVILA, Julio & EECKHOUT, Jan & MARTINELLI, César, . "Bargaining over public goods," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2185, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Julio Davila & Jan Eeckhout & C. Martinelli, 2009. "Bargaining over Public Goods," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00633592, HAL.
- Julio Davila & Jan Eeckhout & César Martinelli, 2008. "Bargaining over public goods," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne b08041, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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