This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs and let us conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end game effects and they do very little updating of beliefs.
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Paper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series ThE Papers with number
08/01.
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