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Reciprocal beliefs and out-group cooperation: evidence from a public good game

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  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo
  • Kernohan, David
  • Oyediran, Olusegun
  • Rivas, M. Fernanda

Abstract

This experimental study examines latent racial prejudice toward out-groups among 152 Spanish college students when they make guesses about the contributions of others in a public good game. Prejudice is examined firstly from the perspective of a two-sided, implicitly-held belief toward any of the specified out-groups: Africans, Asians, Latin Americans and Western. Secondly, from an ordinal perspective of highest negative (positive) prejudice. Lastly models of racial beliefs are fitted for the four out-groups. Results suggest subjects expect Africans and Latin Americans to be less cooperative, but Asians and Western to be more cooperative, than they actually are. We also find that racial prejudices do not have unique determinants across the out-groups under study, nor do the determining factors work in similar directions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 55945.

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Date of creation: 13 May 2014
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:55945

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Keywords: Beliefs; Implicit Cognition; Multiculturalism; Prejudice; Public Good Game; Stereotypes;

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  1. Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Brañas Garza, Pablo, 2010. "Unraveling Public Good Games: The Role of Priors," DFAEII Working Papers 2010-04, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  2. Black, Dan A, 1995. "Discrimination in an Equilibrium Search Model," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 309-33, April.
  3. Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, 2001. "Employer Learning And Statistical Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 313-350, February.
  4. Juan Camilo Cardenas & Jeffrey Carpenter, 2008. "Behavioural Development Economics: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(3), pages 311-338.
  5. Neal, Derek A & Johnson, William R, 1996. "The Role of Premarket Factors in Black-White Wage Differences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 869-95, October.
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