This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Time-Inconsistent Environmental Policy And Optimal Delegation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Richard Mash
Cameron Hepburn
Dieter Helm

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repec.org/res2004/MashHepburnHelm.pdf
File Format:
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 with number 14.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 17 Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2004:14

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/society/annualconf.asp
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Poterba, James M, 1989. "Lifetime Incidence and the Distributional Burden of Excise Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 325-30, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Dieter Helm & Cameron Hepburn & Richard Mash, 2003. "Credible Carbon Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(3), pages 438-450.
  4. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Browning, Edgar K, 1976. "The Marginal Cost of Public Funds," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(2), pages 283-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Gersbach, Hans & Glazer, Amihai, 1999. "Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 151-164, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Dasgupta, P, 1971. "Differential Taxation, Public Goods and Economic Efficiency," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 151-74, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ballard, Charles L & Fullerton, Don, 1992. "Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 117-31, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Biglaiser, Gary & Horowitz, John K & Quiggin, John, 1995. "Dynamic Pollution Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 33-44, July.
  11. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Marsiliani, Laura & Renstrom, Thomas I, 2000. "Time Inconsistency in Environmental Policy: Tax Earmarking as a Commitment Solution," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C123-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Abrego, Lisandro & Perroni, Carlo, 1999. "Investment Subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 533, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Joerg Breitscheidel & Hans Gersbach, 2005. "Self-Financing Environmental Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Agnes d'Artigues & Jacques Percebois & Thierry Vignolo, 2007. "The Time-Inconsistency of Alternative Energy Policy," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/32, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Each page is provided with a technical contact, in case something is not right with the supplied information. See under "publisher info".

This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.