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Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 2004 an Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott

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  • Ansgar Belke
  • Ralph Setzer

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File URL: http://www.uni-hohenheim.de/RePEc/hoh/papers/248.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany in its series Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim with number 248/2004.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:hoh:hohdip:248

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Web page: http://www.uni-hohenheim.de/institution/institut-fuer-economics-11
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  1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  2. Belke, Ansgar, 2000. " Partisan Political Business Cycles in the German Labour Market? Empirical Tests in the Light of the Lucas-Critique," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 104(3-4), pages 225-83, September.
  3. Jeffrey R. Campbell & Jonas D.M. Fisher, 1998. "Aggregate employment fluctuations with microeconomic asymmetries," Working Paper Series, Macroeconomic Issues WP-96-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  4. Michael Frenkel & Christian Pierdzioch & Georg Stadtmann, 2002. "Devisenmarktoperationen und Informationspolitik der Europäischen Zentralbank," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(1), pages 49-68, 02.
  5. Susanto Basu & John G. Fernald, 1996. "Returns to scale in U.S. production: estimates and implications," International Finance Discussion Papers, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 546, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  6. Clarida, Richard & Galí, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 2139, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Robert E. Lucas Jr. & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy Without Capital," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 532, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Lucas, Robert Jr, 1976. "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 19-46, January.
  9. Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies 630, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  10. David K. Backus & Patrick J. Kehoe & Finn E. Kydland, 1987. "International real business cycles," Working Papers 426, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  11. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  12. Svensson, L.E.O., 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies 595, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  13. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
  14. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2004. "Optimal Simple and Implementable Monetary and Fiscal Rules," NBER Working Papers 10253, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Giavazzi, Francesco & Pagano, Marco, 1988. "The advantage of tying one's hands : EMS discipline and Central Bank credibility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1055-1075, June.
  16. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
  17. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1982. "Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1345-70, November.
  18. Mendoza, Enrique G, 1991. "Real Business Cycles in a Small Open Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 797-818, September.
  19. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 211-21, April.
  20. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  21. Frank Smets & Raf Wouters, 2003. "An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1123-1175, 09.
  22. Edmund S. Phelps, 1968. "Money-Wage Dynamics and Labor-Market Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 678.
  23. Jürgen von Hagen, 2004. "Hat die Geldmenge ausgedient?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(4), pages 423-453, November.
  24. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
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