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Credible Carbon Policy

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  • Dieter Helm
  • Cameron Hepburn
  • Richard Mash

Abstract

The paper sets out the credibility problem in carbon policy, provides a number of examples of non-credibility in recent energy policy, and identifies the costs of failing to address it. The time inconsistency of carbon policy--arising because of multiple objectives, the irreversibility of energy investments, and the scope for ex-post reneging on ex-ante commitments to set policy instruments, such as carbon taxes or emission permits, at appropriate levels--is set in a conceptual framework. Analogies with monetary policy are drawn, and a solution to the time-inconsistency problem is proposed through the establishment of an energy/carbon agency. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Review of Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 19 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 438-450
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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:19:y:2003:i:3:p:438-450

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2009. "Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 160-170, September.
  2. Richard Mash & Dieter Helm & Cameron Hepburn, 2003. "Time Inconsistent Environmental Policy and Optimal Delegation," Economics Series Working Papers 175, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Martimort, David & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2011. "A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements," IDEI Working Papers 682, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 21 Sep 2011.
  4. Brunekreeft, G. & McDaniel, T., 2005. "Policy uncertainty and supply adequacy in electric power," Discussion Paper 2005-006, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  5. Julien Pierre Chevallier, 2007. "A differential game of intertemporal emissions trading with market power," EconomiX Working Papers 2007-18, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  6. Alistair Ulph & David Ulph, 2011. "Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 1104, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
  7. Dieter Helm, 2005. "Economic Instruments and Environmental Policy," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 36(3), pages 205-228.
  8. Asheim, Geir B., 2009. "Strategic Use of Environmental Information," Memorandum 21/2009, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  9. Rick Baker & Andrew Barker & Alan Johnston & Michael Kohlhaas, 2008. "The Stern Review: an assessment of its methodology," Staff Working Papers 0801, Productivity Commission, Government of Australia.
  10. Dieter Helm, 2007. "Climate change: Sustainable growth, markets, and institutions," Human Development Occasional Papers (1992-2007) HDOCPA-2007-05, Human Development Report Office (HDRO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
  11. Cameron Hepburn, 2006. "Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or Both: A Review of Instrument Choice," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 226-247, Summer.
  12. Julien Chevallier, 2009. "Intertemporal Emissions Trading and Market Power: A Dominant Firm with Competitive Fringe Model," Working Papers halshs-00388207, HAL.

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