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Incentives to Retire Later: A Solution to the Social Security Crisis?

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  • Friedrich Breyer
  • Mathias Kifmann

Abstract

Als ein möglicher Ausweg aus der drohenden Finanzkrise umlagefinanzierter Rentensysteme wird gegenwärtig eine Anhebung des Rentenzugangsalters von vielen favorisiert. Um allerdings Arbeitnehmern einen Anreiz zur Verlängerung der Lebensarbeitszeit zu geben, muss nach Auffassung der meisten Experten die Beziehung zwischen Beiträgen und Rentenansprüchen gestärkt werden. In dieser Arbeit werden die langfristigen finanziellen Konsequenzen einer solchen Reform analysiert. Wir zeigen, dass bei versicherungsmathematischen Zuschlägen für Mehrarbeit der Beitragssatz langfristig eine steigende Funktion des tatsächlich gewählten Rentenalters ist. Darüber hinaus steigt auch die implizite Steuer, die ein repräsentativer Versicherter an die Rentenkasse zahlt, sofern das Rentenalter in Folge einer ,,steilen" Zuschlagsfunktion zunimmt. In diesem Sinne k¨onnte die vorgeschlagene ,,Behandlung" die diagnostizierte ,,Krankheit" verschlimmern. Abschließend zeigen wir, wie der negative Effekt durch Aufbau eines Kapitalstocks vermieden werden kann. As one possible solution to the well-known financing crisis of unfunded social security systems, an increase in the retirement age is a popular option. To induce workers to retire later, it has been proposed to strengthen the link between retirement age and benefit level. The present paper is devoted to analyzing the long-run financial implications of such a reform. We show that with actuarial adjustments the long-run contribution rate is an increasing function of the retirement age chosen by workers. Moreover, the implicit tax paid to the pension system by a participant can increase in the long run if the retirement age rises in response to a "steep" adjustment rule. In this sense, the proposed "cure" may worsen the disease. Finally, we propose an alternative adjustment scheme which avoids these negative consequences. Finally, we show how the negative effects can be avoided by forming a capital stock from the additional revenues due to later retirement.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 266.

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Length: 26 p.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp266

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Keywords: Pay-as-you-go; retirement age; actuarial adjustment;

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References

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  1. Mathias Kifman & Dirk Schindler, 2000. "Smoothing the Implicit Tax Rate in a Pay-as-you-go Pension System," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(3), pages 261-, May.
  2. Martin Feldstein & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2001. "Social Security," NBER Working Papers 8451, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Feldstein, Martin & Liebman, Jeffrey B., 2002. "Social security," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 32, pages 2245-2324 Elsevier.
  3. Courtney Coile & Jonathan Gruber, 2000. "Social Security and Retirement," NBER Working Papers 7830, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Blundell, Richard & Johnson, Paul, 1998. "Pensions and Labor-Market Participation in the United Kingdom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 168-72, May.
  5. Breyer, Friedrich, 2001. "Why Funding is not a Solution to the "Social Security Crisis"," IZA Discussion Papers 328, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Hassler, John & Lindbeck, Assar, 1997. "Optimal actuarial fairness in pension systems: A note," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 251-255, August.
  7. Kapteyn, Arie & de Vos, Klaas, 1998. "Social Security and Labor-Force Participation in the Netherlands," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 164-67, May.
  8. Borsch-Supan, Axel & Schnabel, Reinhold, 1998. "Social Security and Declining Labor-Force Participation in Germany," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 173-78, May.
  9. Gruber, Jonathan & Wise, David, 1998. "Social Security and Retirement: An International Comparison," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 158-63, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Walter H. Fisher & Christian Keuschnigg, 2007. "Pension Reform and Labor Market Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2057, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Unemployment, human capital depreciation and pension benefits: an empirical evaluation of German data," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(02), pages 223-241, April.
  3. Kuhn, Michael & Wrzaczek, Stefan & Prskawetz, Alexia & Feichtinger, Gustav, 2011. "Optimal Choice of Health and Retirement in a Life-Cycle Model," Annual Conference 2011 (Frankfurt, Main): The Order of the World Economy - Lessons from the Crisis 48681, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  4. Friedrich Breyer & Stefan Hupfeld, 2007. "On the Fairness of Early Retirement Provisions," CESifo Working Paper Series 2078, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Enrique Fatás & Juan Lacomba & Francisco Lagos & Ana Moro-Egido, 2013. "An experimental test on dynamic consumption and lump-sum pensions," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 393-413, November.
  6. Breyer, Friedrich & Franz, Wolfgang & Homburg, Stefan & Schnabel, Reinhold & Wille, Eberhard, 2004. "Reform der sozialen Sicherung," EconStor Books, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, number 92399, November.
  7. Martin Werding, 2007. "Versicherungsmathematisch korrekte Rentenabschläge für die gesetzliche Rentenversicherung," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 60(16), pages 19-32, 08.
  8. Arnds, Pascal & Bonin, Holger, 2002. "Frühverrentung in Deutschland: Ökonomische Anreize und institutionelle Strukturen," IZA Discussion Papers 666, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Enrique Fatás & Juan A. Lacomba & Francisco M. Lagos & Ana I. Moro, 2008. "Experimental tests on consumption, savings and pensions," ThE Papers 08/14, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
  10. Axel Börsch-Supan & Barbara Berkel, 2004. "Pension Reform in Germany: The Impact on Retirement Decisions," MEA discussion paper series 04062, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.

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