This paper presents a theoretical model to show that in sectors where workers invest in firm specific knowledge employment protection legislation can raise employment, productivity and welfare. The model also predicts a U-shaped relation between firing costs and unemployment. Finally, it gives a rationale for the observation that more educated workers tend to have better protected jobs.
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Paper provided by DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade in its series DEGIT Conference Papers with number
c009_004.
Michele Belot & Jan Boone & Jan Van Ours, 2007.
"Welfare-Improving Employment Protection,"
Economica,
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(295), pages 381-396, 08.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs J8 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards
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