Job protection, minimum wage and employment
AbstractWe analyse how wage setting institutions and job-security provisions interact on unemployment. The assumption that wages are renegotiated by mutual agreement only is introduced in a matching model with endogenous job destruction "à la" Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in order to get wage profiles with proper microdoundations. Then, it is shown that job protection policies influence the wage distribution and that government mandated severance transfers from employers to workers are not any more neutral, as in the standard matching model where wages are continuously renegotiated: In our framework high redundancy transfers influence employment. Moreover, the assumption of renegotiation by mutual agreement allows us to introduce a minimum wage in a coherent way, and to study its interactions with job protection policies. Our computational exercises suggest that redundancy transfers and administrative dismissal restrictions have negligeable unemployment effects when wages are flexible or when the minimum wage is low, but a dramatic positive impact on unemployment when there is a high minimum wage.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CEPREMAP in its series CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) with number 9914.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Zylberberg, Andre & Cahuc, Pierre, 1999. "Job Protection, Minimum Wage and Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 95, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Pierre Cahuc & André Zylberberg, 1999. "Job Protection, Minimum Wage and Unemployment," Working Papers 99-38, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- H29 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other
- J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
- J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-11-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-1999-11-08 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-LAB-1999-11-08 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-PBE-1999-11-08 (Public Economics)
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