Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Effect of Employment Protection Rules on Firm Productivity - A Natural Experiment

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bjuggren, Carl Magnus

    ()
    (HUI Research)

Abstract

In this paper I study the effect of employment protection rules on firm productivity using micro data on Swedish firms. A reform of the employment protection rules in 2001 made it possible for small firms to exempt two employees from the last-in-first-out rules. The reform targeted only firms with less than 11 employees, representing a natural experiment. I exploit this using a difference-in-differences framework to estimate the reform's effect on labor productivity. By using firm register data I am able to get a precise estimate of labor productivity for all firms in the economy. The results indicate that the reform increased labor productivity by 2.5 percent for the treatment group of small firms compared to the control group of larger firms. This is shown to be economically significant. The results appear to be driven by the smallest firms and firms that were downsizing. When restricting the sample to include only firms that were downsizing and firms that stayed within the group of treatment and control throughout the whole time period, the estimated increase in labor productivity reaches 6 percent. This effect is likely due to a combination of a decrease in moral hazard behavior and an increased possibility for small firms to retain or lay o personnel based on the worker's idiosyncratic productivity.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.hui.se/BinaryLoader.axd?OwnerID=3a577059-d869-4d1b-bff1-5673eefc3461&OwnerType=0&PropertyName=EmbeddedFile_518498f2-f5b0-43d7-8db6-a82c4e598d1c&FileName=HUIwp82_1.pdf&Attachment=True
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Helena Nilsson)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HUI Research in its series HUI Working Papers with number 82.

as in new window
Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 25 Mar 2013
Date of revision: 30 Oct 2013
Handle: RePEc:hhs:huiwps:0082

Contact details of provider:
Postal: HUI Research, Regeringsgatan 60, 103 29 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 (0)8 762 72 80
Fax: +46 (0)8 679 76 06
Email:
Web page: http://www.hui.se/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: employment protection; labor market regulations; labor productivity; last-in-first-out rules;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, 2009. "Regression Discontinuity Designs In Economics," Working Papers 1118, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  2. Olsson, Martin, 2007. "Employment Protection and Sickness Absence," Working Paper Series 717, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  3. Federico Cingano & Marco Leonardi & Julián Messina & Giovanni Pica, 2010. "The effects of employment protection legislation and financial market imperfections on investment: evidence from a firm-level panel of EU countries," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 25, pages 117-163, 01.
  4. Assar Lindbeck & Marten Palme & Mats Persson, 2006. "Job Security and Work Absence: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 1687, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Hopenhayn, Hugo & Rogerson, Richard, 1993. "Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 915-38, October.
  6. Pissarides, Christopher A., 2001. "Employment protection," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 131-159, May.
  7. Cahuc, Pierre & Postel-Vinay, Fabien, 2002. "Temporary jobs, employment protection and labor market performance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, February.
  8. Roberto M. Samaniego, 2006. "Employment Protection and High-Tech Aversion," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 224-241, April.
  9. Micco, Alejandro & Pagés, Carmen, 2006. "The Economic Effects of Employment Protection: Evidence from International Industry-Level Data," IZA Discussion Papers 2433, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Riphahn, Regina T., 2004. "Employment protection and effort among German employees," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 353-357, December.
  11. Michele Belot & Jan Boone & Jan Van Ours, 2007. "Welfare-Improving Employment Protection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(295), pages 381-396, 08.
  12. Bartelsman, Eric & Haltiwanger, John C. & Scarpetta, Stefano, 2004. "Microeconomic Evidence of Creative Destruction in Industrial and Developing Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 1374, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  13. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1999. "The Political Economy of Employment Protection," CEPR Discussion Papers 2109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Nickell, S. & Layard, R., 1997. "Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance," Papers 23, Centre for Economic Performance & Institute of Economics.
  15. Bassanini, Andrea & Nunziata, Luca & Venn, Danielle, 2008. "Job Protection Legislation and Productivity Growth in OECD Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 3555, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  16. Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher A, 1994. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 397-415, July.
  17. Assar Lindbeck & Dennis J. Snower, 2001. "Insiders versus Outsiders," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 165-188, Winter.
  18. Koeniger, Winfried, 2005. "Dismissal costs and innovation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 79-84, July.
  19. David H. Autor & William R. Kerr & Adriana D. Kugler, 2007. "Does Employment Protection Reduce Productivity? Evidence From US States," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(521), pages 189-217, 06.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bornhäll, Anders & Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov & Rudholm, Niklas, 2014. "Employment Protection Legislation and Firm Growth: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," HUI Working Papers 102, HUI Research.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:huiwps:0082. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Helena Nilsson).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.