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Job security and training: the case of Pareto improving firing taxes

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Author Info

  • Andrea Ricci
  • Robert Waldmann

Abstract

This paper shows that the under-investment in firm financed training caused by hold up can justify the introduction of firing taxes in a laissez-faire economy with search frictions and risk neutral agents. More precisely we highlight two results. First, the introduction of a firing tax for newly hired workers combined with hiring subsidies, always acts as a Pareto improving policy. Second, with no hiring subsidies, the introduction of a firing tax for the newly hired always increase the welfare of employed while its impact on the welfare of unemployed depends on the returns to training. We also analyze the implications of such a policy if a minimum wage is binding for newly hired workers.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia, Finanza e Statistica in its series Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, Finanza e Statistica with number 91/2011.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pia:wpaper:91/2011

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Related research

Keywords: employment protection; training; hold-up; welfare.;

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References

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  1. Jens Suedekum & Peter Ruehmann, 2003. "Severance Payments and Firm-specific Human Capital," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 17(1), pages 47-62, 03.
  2. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April.
  3. Masanori Hashimoto & Ben T. Yu, 1980. "Specific Capital, Employmemt Contracts, and Wage Rigidity," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 536-549, Autumn.
  4. Micco, Alejandro & Pagés, Carmen, 2006. "The Economic Effects of Employment Protection: Evidence from International Industry-Level Data," IZA Discussion Papers 2433, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Garibaldi, Pietro, 1998. "Job flow dynamics and firing restrictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 245-275, February.
  6. Hopenhayn, Hugo & Rogerson, Richard, 1993. "Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 915-38, October.
  7. Koeniger, Winfried, 2005. "Dismissal costs and innovation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 79-84, July.
  8. Roberto M. Samaniego, 2006. "Employment Protection and High-Tech Aversion," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 224-241, April.
  9. Booth, Alison L. & Zoega, Gylfi, 2003. "On the welfare implications of firing costs," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 759-775, November.
  10. Hashimoto, Masanori, 1981. "Firm-Specific Human Capital as a Shared Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 475-82, June.
  11. Etienne Wasmer, 2006. "General versus Specific Skills in Labor Markets with Search Frictions and Firing Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 811-831, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Francesco Venturini, 2011. "Product variety, product quality, and evidence of Schumpeterian endogenous growth: a note," Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, Finanza e Statistica 93/2011, Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia, Finanza e Statistica.

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