A note on successive oligopolies and vertical mergers
Abstract
In this paper we analyze how the technology used by downstream firms can influence input and output market prices. We show via an example that both these prices increase under a decreasing returns technology while the countrary holds when the technology is constant.Download Info
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques in its series Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) with number 2007036.Length: 14
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2007036
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Related research
Keywords: successive oligopolies; vertical integration; technology; foreclosure;Other versions of this item:
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2007. "A note on successive oligopolies and vertical mergers," CORE Discussion Papers 2007074, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-01-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-01-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2008-01-05 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2008-01-05 (Microeconomics)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2006. "Competition in successive markets : entry and mergers," CORE Discussion Papers 2006097, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Long, 1996.
"Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 409-432, 09.
- Gérard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1995. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure and Profits in the Presence of Double Marginalisation," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-40, CIRANO.
- Gérard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1993. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure and Profits in the Presence of Double Marginalisation," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9308, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Jean Gabszewicz & Didier Laussel & Tanguy Van Ypersele & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2008.
"Market games and successive oligopolies,"
CREA Discussion Paper Series
08-05, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
- Jean J. GABSZEWICZ & Didier, LAUSSEL & Tanguy, VAN YPERSELE & S, ZANAJ, 2007. "Market Games and Successive Oligopolies," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007009, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & LAUSSEL, Didier & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2007. "Market games and successive oligopolies," CORE Discussion Papers 2007010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Salinger, Michael A, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-56, May.
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