In this paper we ?rst introduce an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting from the two approaches are analysed under di¤erent technological regimes, decreasing vs constant returns.
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Paper provided by Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg in its series CREA Discussion Paper Series with number
08-05.
GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & LAUSSEL, Didier & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2007.
"Market games and successive oligopolies,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2007010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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