In this paper we consider a market situation in which initially there is an unintegrated monopoly upstream that owns an important facility and two dowstream firms. Then the market is liberalized allowing upstream entry and vertical integration. The equilibrium entry mode–sharing the incumbent facility or building a new facility– is derived as well as the equilibrium market structure. Several policy prescriptions are set forth.
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Paper provided by Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number
195.
Length: Date of creation: 2004 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:195
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Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003.
"A Primer on Foreclosure,"
IDEI Working Papers
203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005.
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