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On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects

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Author Info
Chen, Yongmin

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Abstract

It is well known that vertical integration cats change the pricing incentive of an upstream producer. However, it has not been noticed that vertical integration may also change the pricing incentive of downstream producer and the incentive of a competitor in choosing input suppliers. I develop an equilibrium theory of vertical merger that incorporates these additional strategic considerations. Under fairly general conditions, a vertical merger will result in both efficiency gains and a collusive effect. The competitive effects of a vertical merger depend on the cost of switching suppliers and the degree of downstream product differentiation. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 667-85
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:32:y:2001:i:4:p:667-85

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Reiffen, David, 1992. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 694-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  3. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1992. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 698-703, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-26, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1987. "Cost-Raising Strategies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 19-34, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Salinger, Michael A, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-56, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Riordan, Michael H, 1998. "Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1232-48, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1975. "Vertical Integration and Communication," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(1), pages 173-183, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ramón Faulí-Oller & Joel Sandonís, 2003. "On The Competitive Effects Of Vertical Integration Under Product Differentiation," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-31, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  2. Kerem Cakirer, 2007. "A Fixed Effect Model of Endogenous Integration Decision and Its Competitive Effects," Working Papers 2007-18, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hans-Theo Normann, 2004. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure in the Repeated Game," Industrial Organization 0408008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Felipe Balmaceda & Eduardo Saavedra, 2004. "Vertical Integration and Shared Facilities in Unregulated Industries," Documentos de Trabajo 195, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Felipe Balmaceda & Eduardo Saavedra, 2005. "Integración Vertical Eficiente y Compartimiento de Facilidades en Presencia de Entrada: Un Marco Conceptual," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv168, Ilades-Georgetown University, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dieter Schmidtchen & Christoph Bier, . "Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg?," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2005-1-1123, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  7. Yongmin Chen & Jota Ishikawa & Zhihao Yu, 2002. "Trade Liberalization and Strategic Outsourcing," Carleton Economic Papers 02-12, Carleton University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Arijit Mukherjee2 & Piercarlo Zanchettin, 2007. "Vertical integration and product innovation," Discussion Papers in Economics 07/12, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. [Downloadable!]
  9. David E. M. Sappington, 2005. "On the Irrelevance of Input Prices for Make-or-Buy Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1631-1638, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Dieter Schmidtchen & Christoph Bier, . "Netznutzungsentgelte als Wettbewerbshindernis? Diskriminierungsanreize und Regulierung in liberalisierten Strommärkten - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse <br> <br> The Access Pricing Proble," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1158, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  11. Bühler, Stefan & Schmutzler, Armin, 2003. "Who Integrates?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2004. "Intimidating Competitors – Endogenous Vertical Integration and Downstream Investment in Successive Oligopoly," Working Papers 0409, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Zava Aydemir & Stefan Buehler, 2002. "Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply," Working Papers 0212, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2004. "Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 904, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2003. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Bourreau, Marc & Hombert, Johan & Pouyet, Jérôme & Schutz, Nicolas, 2007. "Wholesale Markets in Telecommunications," CEPR Discussion Papers 6224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Joshua S Gans, 2004. "Vertical Contracting When Competition for Orders Precedes Procurement," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 123, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  18. James D. Dana & Kathryn Spier, 2000. "Entry Deterrence in a Duopoly Model," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1451, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  19. Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2003. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-013, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
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