Seemingly competitive food retail regulations : who do they really help ?
AbstractThe food distribution and retail sectors in Quebec are highly concentrated and integrated as large food distributors are also involved in food retailing. As such, they are competing with small grocery and convenience stores they sell inputs to. A review of the industry suggests that there are important economies of size in distribution, but that smaller stores offering convenience face a more inelastic demand. Concerns over the survival of smaller stores in Quebec have motivated two types of regulations. The first type aims at reducing the cost advantage of dominant retailers by restricting the number of employees that they are allowed to use during specific time periods. The second type restricts retail prices. We develop a simple model capturing the main features of the industry to ascertain the impact of these regulations on retail and wholesale prices. Our results suggest that these regulations reduce welfare and may induce both tighter margins and lower surplus for small retailers.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) in its series Working Papers with number 200801.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1241 rue des Résidences, Domaine Universitaire, 38400 Saint Martin d'Hères
Phone: (0033) 4 76 82 54 39
Web page: http://www.grenoble.inra.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Bruno Larue & Olivier Bonroy, 2009. "Seemingly Competitive Food Retail Regulations: Who Do They Really Help?," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 57(3), pages 305-324, 09.
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2008-09-29 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-09-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2008-09-29 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, December.
- Salinger, Michael A, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-56, May.
- Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-42, March.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2007:i:25:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bonroy, Olivier & Larue, Bruno, 2006.
"Forward Vertical Integration: The Fixed-Proportion Case Revisited,"
65, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Olivier Bonroy & Bruno Larue, 2007. "Forward Vertical Integration: The Fixed-Proportion Case Revisited," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(25), pages 1-9.
- Olivier Bonroy & Bruno Larue, 2007. "Forward vertical integration : the fixed-proportion case revisited," Working Papers 11765, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
- Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Schmalensee, Richard, 1973. "A Note on the Theory of Vertical Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 442-49, Part I, M.
- Vernon, John M & Graham, Daniel A, 1971. "Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(4), pages 924-25, July-Aug..
- Bruno Larue & Jean-Philippe Gervais, 2002. "Welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing tariffs with a few domestic firms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 35(4), pages 786-804, November.
- Greg Shaffer & Stephen W. Salant, 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 585-604, June.
- Quirmbach, Herman C, 1992. "Sequential Vertical Integration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 1101-11, August.
- Perry, Martin K, 1978. "Vertical Integration: The Monopsony Case," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 561-70, September.
- Perry, Martin K., 1989. "Vertical integration: Determinants and effects," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 183-255 Elsevier.
- Lambert, Remy, 2012. "A Primer on the Economics of Supply Management and Food Supply Chains," Working Papers 125246, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Agnès Vertier).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.