Vertical Integration and Communication
AbstractAmong the many possible motives for vertical integration, the one emphasized here is uncertainty in the supply of the upstream good and the consequent need for information by downstream firms. The basic conclusion is that, even when the initial conditions are of the type usually thought of as competitive, the upshot will be a tendency to imperfect competition.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 6 (1975)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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