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Vertical Integration and Shared Facilities in Unregulated Industries

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Author Info
Eduardo Saavedra () (ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado)
Felipe Balmaceda (Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile)
Abstract

I this paper we consider a market situation in which initially there is an unintegrated monopoly upstream entry and vertical integration. The equilibrium entry mode -sharing the incumbent facility or building a new facility- is derived as well as the equilibrium market structure. Several policy prescriptions are set forth.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines in its series ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers with number inv153.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv153

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Related research
Keywords: Esencial facilities; shared facilities agreements; vertical integration; strategic substitutes;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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  1. Felipe Balmaceda, 2006. "Mergers and CEO power," Documentos de Trabajo 224, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
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