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Market Games in Successive Oligopolies

Author

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  • JEAN GABSZEWICZ
  • DIDIER LAUSSEL
  • TANGUY YPERSELE
  • SKERDILAJDA ZANAJ

Abstract

This paper first introduces an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies do operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting from the two approaches are analysed under different technological regimes, decreasing vs constant returns.
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Suggested Citation

  • Jean Gabszewicz & Didier Laussel & Tanguy Ypersele & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2013. "Market Games in Successive Oligopolies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(3), pages 397-410, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:15:y:2013:i:3:p:397-410
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jpet.2013.15.issue-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2006. "Competition in successive markets : entry and mergers," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006097, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Gabszewicz, J. & Michel, P., 1992. "Oligopoly Equilibria in Exchange Economies," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 92.26, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    3. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 347-347.
    4. Zanaj Skerdilajda, 2010. "Successive Oligopolies and Decreasing Returns," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, November.
    5. Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1996. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 409-432, September.
    6. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-142, March.
    7. Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean J. Gabszewicz & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2008. "Upstream Market Foreclosure," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 13-26, January.
    2. Creti, Anna & Sanin, María-Eugenia, 2017. "Does environmental regulation create merger incentives?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 618-630.
    3. GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2007. "A note on successive oligopolies and vertical mergers," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Habiger, Peter & Kopel, Michael, 2020. "Strategic delegation in successive oligopolies with differentiated firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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