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Market games and successive oligopolies

Author

Listed:
  • GABSZEWICZ, Jean J.

    (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

  • LAUSSEL, Didier
  • VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy
  • ZANAJ, Skerdilajda

    (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

Abstract

This paper first introduces an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies do operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting from the two approaches are analysed under different technological regimes, decreasing vs constant returns.

Suggested Citation

  • GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & LAUSSEL, Didier & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2007. "Market games and successive oligopolies," CORE Discussion Papers 2007010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2007010
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    File URL: http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2007_10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gabszewicz, J. & Michel, P., 1992. "Oligopoly Equilibria in Exchange Economies," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 92.26, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    2. GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, 2006. "Competition in successive markets : entry and mergers," CORE Discussion Papers 2006097, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Long, 1996. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 409-432, September.
    4. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-142, March.
    5. Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Creti, Anna & Sanin, María-Eugenia, 2017. "Does environmental regulation create merger incentives?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 618-630.
    2. Jean J., GABSZEWICZ & Skerdilajda, ZANAJ, 2007. "A note on successive oligopolies and vertical mergers," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007036, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    3. Anna CRETI & María-Eugenia SANIN, 2016. "Does environmental regulation create merger incentives?," Documents de recherche 16-07, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    successive oligopolies; market games; entry; double marginalization;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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