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Competitive in successive markets : entry and mergers

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Author Info
Jean J. GABSWEWICZ, Skerkilajda ZANAJ (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Department of Economics)
Skerdilajda, ZANAJ

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Abstract

This paper analyses successive markets where the intra-market linkage depends on the technology used to produce the final output. We investigate entry of new firms, when entry obtains by expanding the economy as well as collusive agreements between firms. We highlight the differentiated effects of entry corresponding to a constant or decreasing returns, free entry in both markets does not entail the usual tendency for the input price to adjust to its marginal cost while it does under constant returns. Then, we analyse collusive agreements by stressing the role of upstream linkage on the profitability of horizontal mergers ˆ la Salant, Switzer and Reynolds

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques in its series Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) with number 2006055.

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Length: 23
Date of creation: 17 Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006055

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Related research
Keywords: Oligopoly; entry; horizontal collusion; foreclosure;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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  1. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gérard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1995. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure and Profits in the Presence of Double Marginalisation," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-40, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Claude, et al d'Aspremont, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Manfred Neumann & Uli Fell & Richard Reichel*, 2005. "Successive Oligopolies, Vertical Downstream Integration and Foreclosure," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 59-77, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Hansen, Terje & Jaskold-Gabszewicz, Jean, 1972. "Collusion of factor owners and distribution of social output," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 1-18, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Maria Eugenia, SANIN & Skerdilajda, ZANAJ, 2007. "Environmental innovation under Cournot competition," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007031, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Jean J., GABSZEWICZ & Skerdilajda, ZANAJ, 2007. "A note on successive oligopolies and vertical mergers," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007036, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
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