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Assortative Matching and the Education Gap

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Ximena Peña ()

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Abstract

This paper attempts to explain the decrease and reversal of the education gap between males and females. Given a continuum of agents, the education decisions are modelled as an assignment game with endogenous types. In the …rst stage agents choose their education level and in the second they participate in the labor and marriage markets. Competition among potential matches en- sures that the e¢ cient education levels can always be sustained in equilibrium, but there may be ine¢ cient equilibria. Combining asymmetries intrinsic to the modelled markets the model reproduces the observed education gap.

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Paper provided by BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA in its series BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA with number 002032.

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Length: 36
Date of creation: 20 Dec 2006
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Handle: RePEc:col:000094:002032

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  1. Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2006. "Assortative Matching and Reputation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1553, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2001. "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 333-373, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Yoram Weiss & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2006. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," 2006 Meeting Papers 43, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Fernández, Raquel & Guner, Nezih & Knowles, John, 2001. "Love and Money: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Household Sorting and Inequality," CEPR Discussion Papers 3040, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2000. "Competing Pre-marital Investments," Working Papers peters-00-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Echevarria, Cristina & Merlo, Antonio, 1999. "Gender Differences in Education in a Dynamic Household Bargaining Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(2), pages 265-86, May.
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  7. José-Víctor Ríos-Rull & Virginia Sánchez-Marcos, 2002. "College Attainment of Women," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(4), pages 965-998, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, . ""Efficient Non-Contractible Investments''," CARESS Working Papres 98-13, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
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  9. Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1777, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  10. Jim Albrecht & Aico van Vuuren & Susan Vroman, 2007. "Counterfactual Distributions with Sample Selection Adjustments: Econometric Theory and an Application to the Netherlands," Working Papers gueconwpa~07-07-06, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. James Albrecht & Anders Bjorklund & Susan Vroman, 2003. "Is There a Glass Ceiling in Sweden?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 145-177, January. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Gretsky, Neil E & Ostroy, Joseph M & Zame, William R, 1992. "The Nonatomic Assignment Model," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 103-27, January.
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  13. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz & Ilyana Kuziemko, 2006. "The Homecoming of American College Women: The Reversal of the College Gender Gap," NBER Working Papers 12139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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