This article studies the behavior of the firm when it is searching to fill a vacancy. The principal hypothesis is that the firm can offer two kinds of contracts to the workers, short-term or long-term contracts. We suppose that the worker’s bargaining power over the wage is different according to the type of contract. We utilize this framework to study the firms’ optimal policy choice and its welfare implications.
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Paper provided by Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia in its series Working Paper CRENoS with number
200819.
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