Screening and short-term contracts
AbstractThis article studies the behavior of the firm when it is searching to fill a vacancy. The principal hypothesis is that the firm can offer two kinds of contracts to the workers, short-term or long-term contracts. We suppose that the worker’s bargaining power over the wage is different according to the type of contract. We utilize this framework to study the firms’ optimal policy choice and its welfare implications.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia in its series Working Paper CRENoS with number 200819.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
search; temporary employment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-01-31 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2009-01-31 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-LAB-2009-01-31 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Etienne Wasmer, 1997.
"Competition for Jobs in a Growing Economy and the Emergence of Dualism,"
97-15, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Wasmer, Etienne, 1999. "Competition for Jobs in a Growing Economy and the Emergence of Dualism," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(457), pages 349-71, July.
- Wasmer, E., 1997. "Competition for Jobs in a Growing Economy and the Emergence of Dualism," DELTA Working Papers 97-13, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- E Wasmer, 1997. "Competition for Jobs in a Growing Economy and the Emergence of Dualism," CEP Discussion Papers dp0369, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Paolini, Dimitri, 2000. "Two-Sided Search and Temporary Employment," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2000011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979.
"Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-90, October.
- D. Paolini, 2007. "Search and the Firm's Choice of the Optimal Labor Contract," Working Paper CRENoS 200708, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- Jovanovic, Boyan, 1984. "Matching, Turnover, and Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(1), pages 108-22, February.
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