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Temporary Jobs, Employ Protection and Labor Market Performance

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Author Info
Cahuc, Pierre () (Université Paris 1-Eurequa, Crest, Institut Universitaire de France and IZA, Bonn)
Postel-Vinay, Fabien (INRA-LEA)

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Abstract

Many European labor markets are characterized by heavy employment protection taxes and the widespread use of fixed-duration contracts. The simultaneous use of these two policy instruments seems somewhat contradictory since the former primarily aims at limiting job destruction whereas the latter clearly intensifies it. In this paper, we use a simple matching model with endogenous job destructions to analyze the impact of a combination of the two policies. We find that the political support of insiders to firing restrictions does not necessarily worsen unemployment. In fact, it may be the willingness of a majority of workers to support the combination of two instruments with opposite effects on job destruction and job creation that increase unemployment and deteriorates efficiency. Moreover, we argue, that the concentration of firm ownership is likely to influence labor market regulations. We show that the preferred point of a majority of workers is a very flexible labor market, without any firing cost when profits are evenly distributed across the labor force (which portrays a situation where firm ownership is extremely dispersed), whereas a combination of job protection and temporary jobs is preferred by workers when the share of profits that they earn is zero (which corresponds to a situation where firm ownership is concentrated among a few shareholders not participating in the labor market).

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 260.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2001
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp260

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Related research
Keywords: Unemployment fixed duration contracts job destruction employment protection

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H29 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other
J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck, 2002. "Unemployment Compensation Finance and Aggregate Employment Fluctuations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jian-Ping Zhou, 2006. "Reforming Employment Protection Legislation in France," IMF Working Papers 06/108, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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